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11 Introduction
Do labor markets place wage premia on jobs that involve disamenities like physical eﬀort, job
insecurity or bad hours regulation? The answer to that question is a key to understanding
the eﬀectiveness of public policies aimed to improve nonmonetary conditions on jobs. For
example, the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials predicts that a public intervention
to limit the consumption of disamenities on the job may lower the welfare of workers who
choose to consume disamenities in exchange for high wages. Conversely, the same policy
may be eﬀective in a segmented labor market, in which equally productive workers are
placed either in bad jobs (with bad nonmonetary characteristics and low wages) or good jobs
(the opposite). From a diﬀerent perspective, the existence of wage premia to disamenities is
crucial to assess the extent of wage discrimination between two groups of workers, if amenities
are diﬀerentially present on the jobs held by these groups. This paper implements a new
econometric strategy that bounds the wage return to the presence of heavy work load on a
job, bad hours regulation and job insecurity.1
The theoretical foundation for the existence of market return to disamenities comes from
the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials (Rosen, 1986). That theory predicts that
workers sort into jobs according to their preferences and the technological possibilities of
￿rms, so that workers with higher tolerance towards amenities work in ￿rms with higher
cost of provision of amenities. A substantial literature has estimated hedonic wage regression
models to infer whether or not labor markets place premia on jobs that involve physical eﬀort
or job insecurity, obtaining mixed results.2 Hedonic wage regressions are often criticized for
not accounting for measurement error in measuring worker￿s productivity, an omission that
biases the estimates against ￿nding evidence for compensating wage diﬀerentials.3 Other
literature has examined whether or not longitudinal changes in job characteristics following
1The main focus of this work is to recover the market locus between wages and amenities, not to recover
the underlying worker￿s preference parameters and ￿rm cost functions. Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim
(2003) discuss under which conditions these deep structural parameters can be identi￿ed, but they take as
given the market locus between wages and nonmonetary disamenities
2See Lucas (1977) for an early application of this procedure in the US. In France, Daniel and Sofer
(1998) ￿nd mixed evidence for compensating diﬀerentials associated to environmental conditions on the job,
like noise, physical eﬀort, or exposure to vibration. Namely, they ￿nd evidence that in strongly unionized
industries there is a positive relationship between wages and disamenities of bargaining over wages. For the
German case, Lorenz and Wagner (1989) ￿nd that job requirements of physical eﬀort aﬀect wages negatively,
contrary to the predictions of the theory.
3See Hwang et al (1992) for a discussion on the consequences of mismeasuring worker￿s productivity.
Hwang, Reed et al. (1998) discuss other biases associated to the estimation of hedonic models.
2job changes are associated to wage changes.4 Nevertheless, the self-selection of job changers
may bias the estimates of individual ￿xed-eﬀects models (Solon, 1988). Perhaps because
of that evidence, several authors have modi￿ed the implicit markets approach, to analyze
models in which workers care about nonmonetary job characteristics, but in which labor
market imperfections generate a negative relationship between wages and disamenities - see
Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998), Lang and Majumdar (forthcoming) or Sofer and Daniel
(1998). Consistent with that approach, Gronberg and Reed (1994) focus on a diﬀerent
parameter: the worker￿s marginal willingness to pay for the absence of physical eﬀort or
other environmental disamenities on their jobs. Instead of using hedonic regression methods,
Gronberg and Reed estimate the eﬀect of the presence of disamenities on the duration of the
job, using US data.5
This paper implements a new strategy to estimate market monetary returns to the pres-
ence of work strain on a job, to the risk of losing the job and to bad regulation of hours in
Germany.6 We assume that the labor market is characterized by the presence of search fric-
tions, so that there is dispersion in job characteristics and in wages, like in Hwang, Mortensen
and Reed (1998). We ￿rst show that in a market that places wage premia on the presence
of disamenities on jobs, the average wage change of the workers who switch jobs voluntarily
and opt for consuming more disamenities, provides an upper bound on the market return
to the disamenity. The reason is that the distribution of observed wage changes is censored
from below, as oﬀe r st h a td on o tg i v eas u ﬃciently high wage increase are rejected by poten-
tial quitters. Under conditions spelled below, the average wage change following voluntary
switches to jobs with less disamenities provides a lower bound on the market return to the
presence of a disamenity. We also show that, in a labor market that places a wage penalty
on jobs with disamenities, if a worker changes voluntarily to a job with better nonmonetary
characteristics, his or her average wage must increase. Hence, our empirical strategy identi-
￿es whether or not the labor market places wage premia on disamenities consumed on the
job.7
4In the US, Brown (1981) ￿nds no systematic eﬀect of characteristics of jobs that are likely to enter the
utility function of the worker on wages, once unobservable ability is controlled for. In Sweden, Duncan and
Holmlund (1983) also ￿nd mixed evidence for the eﬀect of environmental conditions on wages.
5Gronberg and Reed obtain that workers are willing to pay for the absence of risky conditions and for
the absence of characteristics related to physical eﬀort on the current job.
6We document that a worse work strain is more likely to be reported if workers move to jobs that require
exerting partially or frequently physical eﬀort and working longer hours. Similarly, a bad regulation of hours
is more likely to be reported if the job requires more often overtime work.
7Altonji and Paxson (1988) use a similar methodology to assess whether or not jobs in the US economy
3We test our empirical strategy using a sample of male job changers from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). The German case is specially interesting for two reasons.
The ￿r s ti st h a tG e r m a n yd i dn o te x p e r i e n c et h ei n c r e a s ei nw a g ed i s p e r s i o nt h a ta ﬀected the
US and UK during the 80s (Abraham and Houseman, 1995). An increase in wage inequality
can cause a changing relationship between wages and disamenities through income eﬀects
(see Hamermesh (1999) and Weiss (1976)). Second, the GSOEP is an unusually rich dataset,
containing longitudinal information on the variables needed for the analysis: motives for
job-to-job changes, wages in each job, nonmonetary characteristics of jobs, and individual
satisfaction with the job.
Our strategy proceeds in three steps. First, using a subsample of the GSOEP job chang-
ers, we document that the increases in work load reports are correlated with increases in
physical eﬀort requirements and with increases in hours of work. We also document that
reports of a bad regulation of hours are correlated with more frequent overtime work. Sec-
ond, we test whether or not the job attributes considered enter into the utility of the worker.
This is done by regressing the (individual) change in job satisfaction following a quit, on the
change in several job characteristics. We ￿nd that changes to jobs with a worse work load,
worse regulation of hours, higher probability of losing the job, higher mismatch between
the skills required on the job and the knowledge of the worker, and lower earnings decrease
reported job satisfaction. Finally, we regress the change in the logarithm of the wage after a
quit on separate binary variables indicating if the consumption of the disamenity increased
or decreased after the change. We show that the coeﬃcient of the binary variable indicating
an increase (decrease) in the consumption of the disamenity provides an upper (lower) bound
for the monetary returns to the presence of that disamenity.
The paper has three main ￿n d i n g s . F i r s t ,t h eh y p o t h e s i st h a tt h el a b o rm a r k e tp l a c e s
wage penalties on jobs with disamenities is generally not supported by the data. Second, we
￿nd evidence of trade-oﬀs between wages and three disamenities: heavy work load, mismatch
between worker talents and skills required by the job and, more tentatively, bad regulation
are tied packages of hours and wages. Nevertheless, they do not focus on equilibrium market relationships,
but on the estimation of parameters of the utility function, such as the compensated elasticity of the hours of
work to an increase in the wage. Usui (2003) also exploits wage changes between male and female dominated
jobs to ascertain whether or not jobs with higher proportion of males carry a wage premium, controlling
for possible (unobserved) disamenities. Her identi￿cation strategy diﬀers from ours in two aspects. First,
Usui (2003) relies on the comparison of voluntary and involuntary job changers, that we do not exploit.
Second, our empirical strategy relies on the asymetry of wage changes between changes to jobs involving
higher consumption of disamenities and to jobs involving lower consumption of disamenities. Usui (2003)
does not exploit such asymetry.
4of hours. These results are surprising, given that the German labor market is commonly
regarded as very rigid. We estimate an upper bound of 5% for the market return to working
in a job with a heavy work load, and a lower bound of 3.5%. The upper bound on the
monetary return on working in jobs that involve a set of skills that workers do not typically
have is 6%, and the lower bound is zero. The evidence for a wage premia to bad hours
regulation is mixed. The lower bound on the presence of bad regulation of hours is not
signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero in most speci￿cations. The estimate of the upper bound is
about 4.5% but in some speci￿cations, the estimate is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero.
Finally, we do not ￿nd systematic evidence of trade-oﬀs between job insecurity and wages.
These results are robust to the inclusion of other job characteristics, like industry controls,
fringe bene￿ts, commuting time and possibilities of advancement on the job. To ensure that
the strategy used in the paper is not picking up the eﬀect of promotions, we also examine
the relationship between wages and disamenities in a sample of job movers within the same
￿rm, assuming that such job changes are mainly promotions. We ￿nd that the relationship
between wages and disamenities is statistically diﬀerent for quitters and for individuals who
change jobs within the same ￿rm. Finally, the identi￿cation strategy proposed in this paper
depends crucially on the job change being voluntary, as opposed to a lay-oﬀ, for example.
We discuss that these two types of moves are observationally diﬀerent in the GSOEP.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how the observed evolution of
wages and disamenities after a voluntary job change can be used to infer the presence of
market returns to a disamenity. Section 3 describes the dataset used and the empirical
strategy. Section 4 discusses the measures of job disamenities, and assesses whether or not
they enter into the utility of the worker. Section 5 presents wage regressions on the change
of disamenities among quitters. Section 6 concludes.
2 Wage dispersion and disamenities
This section follows Rosen (1986) and Usui (2003). Consider a job market with search
frictions and in which workers do not observe all available positions. Each job is characterized
by a wage level w and by a level of nonpecuniary disamenities D. Jobs in which D equals 1
are associated with some disamenity (we term these ￿dirty￿ jobs), whereas, D takes value 0 if
the disamenities is not present in the position (￿clean￿ jobs). With an exogenous probability
of arrival, each worker receives a job oﬀer (w,D),a si nH w a n g ,M o r t e n s e na n dR e e d( 1 9 9 8 ) .
5The preferences of a worker are represented as follows
u(w,D)=w − ZD
Z is the (worker-speci￿c) marginal willingness to pay to avoid the consumption of a
disamenity. Higher values of Z denote lower tolerance for disamenities.8
Assumption 1: The oﬀers received by each worker are independent of his or her marginal
willingness to avoid the disamenity.
The rationale behind this assumption is that Z i sn o to b s e r v a b l et o￿rms, that cannot
target their oﬀers to a speci￿c kind of worker. Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) show that
in a labor market with search frictions, a constant arrival rate of oﬀers and heterogeneity in
the cost of provision of amenities by ￿rms, there is an equilibrium distribution of wages and
disamenities in the market. We augment the equilibrium wage distribution in their paper by
including an individual-speci￿cc o m p o n e n t￿, related to the unobserved ability of the worker
so that the wage of a worker is given by the following expression
w = δD + ￿ + ε (1)
δ denotes the market monetary return to the presence of a disamenity. ε denotes the
match-speci￿c productivity, in excess of the average wage of workers with the same unob-
served ability and same job conditions. By de￿nition, E(ε|D,￿)=0 . Further, assumption 1
implies that E(∆ε|Z)=0 .9 Given that we focus on binary indicators of the presence of dis-
amenities, nothing is lost by assuming that (1) is linear. Hwang et al. (1998) and Lang and
8Note that a linear speci￿cation in C and D is not generally restrictive, as one can always de￿ne any utility
function de￿ned over consumption and disamenities u(C,D) (where D can take values 0 and 1,
∂u(C,D)
∂C > 0
and u(C,1) <u (C,0) for a given C). If we denote C0 as the wage level in a position without disamenities,
Z can be de￿ned as the consumption required to accept a job that involves consuming disamenities:
u(C0,0) = u(C0 + Z,1)
9E(∆ε|Z)=0implies that the random arrival of job oﬀers to a worker does not depend on the level of
tolerance of the worker. That condition would not hold in a model in which workers with higher tolerance
were easily identi￿able, and the arrival rate of oﬀers were endogenous and diﬀered across worker groups. In
such a case, an equilibrium could exist in which those workers receive oﬀers better than random E(∆ε|Z) > 0.
In our empirical implementation, we proxy Z by the reported satisfaction in the present job.
6Majumdar (forthcoming) show that, even if all workers dislike the presence of a disamenity
on the job, search frictions can cause δ to be either a positive or negative number.10
Direct estimation of (1) is likely to yield biased estimates of δ, because of well-known
omitted variable in the case of OLS (see Daniel and Sofer (1998), and the references therein)
or because of selection bias of quitters in the case of individual ￿xed eﬀects models (Solon,
1988). Another possibility is to include a selection term, but it is not always straightforward
to ￿nd variables that aﬀect the consumption of disamenities D, but are uncorrelated with
wages.11 We adopt a diﬀerent strategy, exploiting the revealed preference about wages
and disamenities when workers change jobs voluntarily. A worker who changes voluntarily
(Q =1 )attains a higher level of utility after the change so that
u(w1,D 1)=w1 − ZD1 >w 0 − ZD0 = u(w0,D 0)
Where a subscript 1 denotes the new job and 0 denotes the old job. We de￿ne the
following moment that, provided we have a proxy for Z, is observable in the data
E(∆w|Q =1 ,D 1,D 0,Z)=d0 + d11(D1 >D 0)+d21(D1 <D 0) (2)
1(D1 >D 0) (resp. 1(D1 <D 0)) is an indicator function that takes value one if the level of
disamenities increased (decreased) after the job change and zero otherwise. Next, we discuss
how a sample of voluntary job changers allows us to relate d1 and d2 to the parameter of
interest δ.
2.1 Case 1: Labor markets reward the presence of a disamenity
(δ > 0)
Assume that δ is positive. Consider a worker who currently has a ￿clean￿ job (D0 =0 ).
That worker only accepts a ￿dirty￿ job if the wage diﬀerence is enough to compensate the
10Hwang, et al. (1998) show that δ c o u l db en e g a t i v ei ft h ea r r i v a lo ﬀer rate is high enough relative to
the (exogenous) job destruction rate. Using a model of nonsequential search, Lang and Majumdar (2003)
also show that a market with search frictions has an equilibrium solution. In the case in which workers
are heterogenous in Z, they show that the market relationship between w and D can be either positive or
negative.
11See Olson (2002), for an application for the US regarding the monetary payoﬀ for the absence of employer-
provided health insurance.
7worker for the worsened working conditions. In other words, voluntary changes from ￿clean￿
to ￿dirty￿ jobs are only observed if
∆w = w1 − w0 = δ(D1 − D0)+ε1 − ε0 ≥ Z(D1 − D0)
where we have ignored mobility costs for the sake of simplicity. Hence, the observed
average wage change following a (voluntary) job change from ￿clean￿ jobs to ￿dirty￿ ones is:
d1 = δ + E∆ε(∆ε|δ + ∆ε ≥ Z,Z)=δ + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε ≥ Z − δ,Z) (2.1)
d1 can be decomposed in two components: the market return to the presence of a dis-
amenity δ, and a selection component E(∆ε|∆ε ≥ Z −δ,Z). The latter component appears
in (2.1) because the selected sample of voluntary changers only includes wage increases that
exceed the worker￿s monetary valuation of consuming disamenities. Given assumption 1, the
second term in the right hand-side of (2.1) is a positive number.12
Similarly, assume that a worker is currently working in a position that involves consuming
disamenities (D0 =1 ). This worker changes to a ￿clean￿ job in which D =0only if the
wage decrease associated to the change is smaller than the utility gain from decreasing the
consumption of disamenities, or ∆w>−Z. Hence, the average wage change following a
voluntary change from a ￿dirty￿ job to a ￿clean￿ one is
d2 = −δ + E∆ε(∆ε| − δ + ∆ε > −Z,Z)=
= −δ + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z + δ,Z) (2.2)
By the same reasoning above, the selection term in the right-hand-side of (2.2) is positive.
The sign of (2.2) is, in principle, undetermined, given that it is the sum of a negative and
a positive component. But we can obtain two restrictions, summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: If the market rewards on average the presence of a disamenity on the job
(δ > 0), (i) d1, the average wage change following a voluntary job change that increases the
12The reason is that E(∆ε|∆ε ≥ Z − δ,Z) ≥ E(∆ε|∆ε ≥− ∞ ,Z)
= E(∆ε|Z)=0 .T h e￿rst inequality arises by the de￿nition of a censored random variable. The second
equality holds by assumption.
8consumption of amenities, is positive and greater than the market return δ (ii) d2 is smaller
in absolute value than d1 (iii) If d2 ≤ 0,t h e n|d2| < δ < |d1|
The proof is derived in Appendix 1.
2.2 Case 2: Labor markets penalize the presence of a disamenity
(δ ≤ 0)
Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) show that an equilibrium locus in which δ ≤ 0 can
arise when the arrival of oﬀers is very high, relative to the job destruction rate. Lang and
Majumdar (forthcoming) provide a similar result.13 For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that δ is zero, and examine the relationship between wage changes and the consumption of
disamenities on the job that such job market generates. Using the same reasoning as in the
previous subsection, the following moment can be de￿ned.
E(∆w|Q =1 ,D 1,D 0)=d0 + d11(D1 >D 0)+d21(D1 <D 0)=
d0 + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε >Z , Z )1(D1 >D 0)+E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε ≥− Z,Z)1(D1 <D 0)
Note that, as in the previous subsection, d1 c a n n o tb el o w e rt h a nd2.14 The following
proposition can be easily derived.
Proposition 2: If there is not average market return to the presence of a disamenity
(δ =0 ) , (i) The average wage increase following a voluntary increase in the consumption of
amenities, d1 is positive (ii) d2 is positive and smaller in absolute value than d1
Voluntary job changes in a segmented labor market are observably diﬀerent from the
former case, as d2 must be greater than zero. The intuition is the following. Voluntary
job changes to jobs with better characteristics imply no relative wage increases, as the
market does not reward the presence of the disamenity. Nevertheless, some potential quitters
will refuse changes that do not entail a suﬃciently high wage increase (in other words,
E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε ≥− Z,Z) is positive.) Overall, the relative wage change following a change to a
job with less disamenities must be positive. By the same reasoning, d2 is also positive if δ is
13Nevertheless, in a model like Hwang et al￿s (1998), when the market equilibrium is such that δ is negative,
one could not observe voluntary job changes from ￿clean￿ to ￿dirty￿ jobs, as the overall utility is higher in
the former. In a diﬀerent setting, Sofer and Daniel (1998) prove that diﬀerential bargaining across sectors
may create a positive relationship between amenities and wages, evidence consistent with a segmented labor
market.
14The reason is that, provided that Z is positive. E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε >Z ,Z ) ≥ E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z,Z),
9strictly negative.15
2.3 Testable implications
￿ In a labor market that penalizes the presence of a disamenity on the job, voluntary job
changes from ￿dirty￿ to ￿clean￿ jobs involve positive wage changes.
￿ I ft h em a r k e tp l a c e sw a g ep r e m i ao nt h ep r e s e n c eo fd i s a m e n i t i e si naj o b ,a v e r a g e
wage changes following voluntary changes from ￿clean￿ to ￿dirty￿ jobs should exceed
average wage changes following voluntary job changes from ￿dirty￿ to ￿clean￿ jobs.
￿ If the market places wage premia on the presence of disamenities, and d2 ≤ 0,t h e
(average) market return to the presence of a disamenity is bounded above by (2.1) and
below by (2.2).
3 The data and the empirical speci￿cation
T h es a m p l ei sd r a w nf r o mt h e1 9 8 4 - 2 0 0 1w a v e so ft h eG e r m a nS oc i o - E c o n o m i cP a n e l( G S O E P ) .
The GSOEP started in 1984, interviewing 5,921 households. Since then, it follows the mem-
bers of the panel. The GSOEP has three features that makes the survey specially suitable
to implement the methodology in the previous section. First, the GSOEP has yearly infor-
mation on wages and, for some years, respondents are asked about several characteristics of
their jobs. Second, workers are asked if they have changed their job in the last year, and
if so, what was the reason of the change. That feature allows us to identify voluntary job
changes. Finally, and most important, an unusual aspect of this survey is that workers are
asked to explicitly compare several characteristics of their new job to the characteristics of
their last one. This aspect has two advantages. First, it is common to impute disamenities
to jobs based on out-of sample surveys on characteristics of occupation or industry, such as
the Dictionary of Occupational Titles in the US. The accuracy of the imputation depends
on the quality of the report of occupational and industry codes, which is not always reliable
(Mellow and Sider, 1983). The problem gets worse when one exploits longitudinal data, as
the bias due to measurement error is exacerbated. Second, the information in the GSOEP
allows for more detailed variation in the change of characteristics than changes in industry
15If δ < 0, |d1| is not necessarily bigger in absolute value than |d2|
10or occupation.16 The exact wording of the question is:
￿How do you view your current position compared to your previous one? In which of the
following points has your new job improved or worsened your status? Or has it stayed about
the same?




(e) work hours regulation?
(f) bene￿ts?
(g) job security?
In addition, the GSOEP asks job changers:
￿Can you use your knowledge and skills more, the same or less than in your last job?￿
G i v e nt h a ti ti sd i ﬃcult to establish a priori what of the aforementioned characteristics
enter into the utility of a worker, Section 4 examines if those characteristics are related to
the reported satisfaction of the worker. From the empirical results, we focus the analysis on
work load (related to the number of hours of work and to the requirement of physical eﬀort
exerted on the job), regulation of hours, job security and match of skills to knowledge.
Our sample contains only observations of male workers in West Germany from 18 to 60
years of age who are not self-employed in the year of the interview. The GSOEP contains
information on 3,305 workers who reported having resigned from their last position.17 We
further restrict our sample of voluntary changes to contain only transitions between full-time
jobs for whom we have information on the hours agreed-upon in the contract both in the
origin and destination jobs. We require weekly agreed hours to lie between 15 and 60. We
also selected job changes in which the respondent had been in his last position for at least a
year. We exclude job changes that take place before the individual did his military service
or completed his education. Overall, we use information on 743 job changes made by 653
16Longitudinal panel data sets in the US such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics contain little
information about the consumption of disamenities on the job.
17The GSOEP ￿rst asks respondents ￿Has your job situation changed since the beginning of (year prior to
the interview)?￿ The following question is ￿Why did you leave this job? Which one of the following points
applies to you?￿
We consider as a ￿quit￿ the answer ￿resigned.￿ See the Data appendix for details on the construction of
the sample.
11individuals.18
The measure of hourly wage is the ratio between last monthly earnings and standard
weekly hours, multiplied by 4.33, and it is discussed in the next subsection. The means,
standard deviation, min and max of the variables used for the sample are described in Table
1. The average age of quitters is 33 years. Voluntary changers in our sample experience an
increase in hourly earnings of 8.5%. In general, a larger fraction of workers report that their
conditions improved than the opposite. In particular, only 7% of changes involve an increase
in job insecurity. 32% of all movers reported that their work load decreased after a voluntary
job change. 43% report an improvement in the regulation of hours. In Table 2, we present
average wage changes by changes in characteristics. Interestingly, on average, voluntary job
changes that involve an increase in the consumption of disamenities, are followed by real wage
increases of about 13%. Improvements in characteristics are associated to wage changes of
about 6% (work load improvements) to 9% (improves in job security.) The pattern of wage
changes appears to roughly support the presence of compensating wage diﬀerentials, although
these simple statistics are not conclusive. Section 5 provides a more complete analysis of
the relationship between changes in the consumption of amenities and wages. Prior to that,
Section 3.1 lays out the empirical speci￿cation.
3.1 Empirical speci￿cation
Let a worker i who is working at job j in moment t for an hourly wage wijt.W ea s s u m et h a t
workers who report having changed voluntarily their position have received a better oﬀer that
increases their level of utility (McLaughlin (1990), argues that a quit is a worker-initiated
separation caused by a better wage-draw). Hence, each observation will be a voluntary
job change. Based on the discussion in (4.1), we concentrate on four disamenities: work
load (D1
jt), ￿exibility of hours (D2
jt), security on the job (D3
jt), and (D4
jt), the match between
worker￿s knowledge and the skills required on the job. The speci￿cation used is the following:



















+γ1Xit + γ2SATISFij−1,t−1 + εijt − εij−1,t−1 (3.1)
18575 workers contribute one quit to the sample, 68 workers contribute two quits, 8 workers contribute
three quits. 2 workers report 4 quits. The number of quits changes per wave, and attains its maximum in
1992, with 96 cases. The minimum number of quits happened in 1985, with 17 cases.
12d0 is the expected wage growth of a person who leaves voluntarily a job for another with
the same observed level of disamenities. 1(Dk
jt >D k
j−1t−1) denotes the event ￿disamenity k
is higher in the new job than in the previous one.￿ dk
2 is the magnitude of the change in the
logarithm of the wage following a voluntary change that involves decreasing the consumption
of disamenities on the job. Following the discussion in Section 2, if there exists a positive
market return to the presence of a disamenity, dk
2 should be either zero or negative. dk
1 is
the magnitude of the change in the logarithm of the wage following a voluntary change that
involves increasing the consumption of disamenities. The second restriction implied by a
market that places positive returns to disamenities is that |dk
1| > |dk
2|. If both conditions




A problem with speci￿cation (3.1) is that we do not observe the hourly wage wijt.T h e
GSOEP asks respondents to report the amount of their net earnings last month, including
overtime. To construct a measure of hourly wages, there are two questions about hours
worked. The ￿rst asks about the average number of hours worked on a regular week (not
necessarily on the last month), including overtime. The second asks about the number of
agreed number of hours, or standard weekly hours. In an analysis on the eﬀect of hours
constraints on hourly wages, Hunt (1999) implicitly uses a measure of hourly wages by
dividing monthly wages on standard weekly hours, adjusting in the regression for a measure
of overtime hours. We follow a similar approach, de￿n i n gt h eh o u r l yw a g ea st h er a t i oo f
monthly net income to standard hours (multiplied by 4.33). Such measure may bias the
hourly wage, in the presence of overtime or undertime in the month of the response. In
section 5.1, we include an adjustment for the change in the number of hours of overtime in
the regression.
Xi contains controls for the education level of the worker at the time of the change,
wave-speci￿c dummies, control for marital status and, in some speci￿cations, industry of
destination dummies. Human capital models predict that workers with higher levels of
education should experience higher wage growth. Wave dummies are included to capture the
eﬀect of the cycle on wages and on the composition of quits. Industry dummies capture re￿ect
sectorial diﬀerences in union bargaining power (see Daniel and Sofer, 1998) or permanent
diﬀerences related to eﬃciency wages. SATISFij−1,t−1 denotes the diﬀerence between the
r e p o r t e dl e v e lo fs a t i s f a c t i o nw i t ht h ep r e s e n tj o bi nt h ep e r i o dp r i o rt ot h ec h a n g ea n dt h e
13individual level mean. The discussion in Section 2 argued that the expected wage increase
when transiting to a higher work load is positive if the tolerance for disamenities is held
constant. We approximate the ￿tolerance for disamenities￿ with the variable ￿satisfaction
with the job,￿ that is asked every wave in the GSOEP.19,20 The rationale is that if amenities
are (longitudinally) correlated with satisfaction, workers who consume disamenities on their
current job should report levels of satisfaction below their individual mean.21
Next, we examine the impact on our estimates of two possible sources of biases.
Subjectivity bias Imagine that a worker leaves a bad match for a better one. That
worker might feel more satis￿ed about the new match, and report that job security, for
example, in the new job is actually better than in the previous one, even though it is not
the case. Such a response pattern would generate non-classical measurement error, and the
estimates of dk
1 and dk
2 would be biased. To assess the direction of the bias and for the sake
of simplicity, we ignore selection issues, and assume that there are no compensating wage
diﬀerentials in the labor market. That is, lnwift = θft ,w h e r eθft represents the quality of
the match. We assume that workers tend to report better characteristics D∗
ft if they are in
a match with higher productivity, or
∆D
∗
ft =1if ∆θft <k
∆D
∗




Where k and k1 are positive scalars. dk
2 = E(∆wift|∆D∗
ft = −1). would equal E(∆wift|∆θft >
k1), a positive number. Similar reasoning would show that dk
1 is negative. That is, such a
19Including the wage prior to the change, in addition to the satisfaction variable, had no impact on our
results.
20Unfortunately, the sample of movers for which we could assign the initial level of disamenities on their
initial job is small, compared to the sample of movers we use, that exploits the report of the change in
characteristics. In an earlier draft, we imputed measures of the presence of disamenities in the original job
using the detailed information in job characteristics in the 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990 and 1995 waves of the
GSOEP. Nevertheless, the subsample of workers for whom we had that information was small.
21An alternative approach to the one described in this paper amounts to regressing changes in wages on
changes in job characteristics (see, for example, Brown, 1981 and Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). Note that,
even after controlling for individual speci￿c ability, a hedonic wage regression in a sample of quitters may not
provide a consistent estimate of δ,a st h ed i ﬀerence between E(∆w) and δ depends on the relative proportion
of changes to jobs with better characteristics and worse characteristics (see Solon, 1988, for a similar point.)
14pattern of reporting error leads our estimates to be biased against the hypothesis of the
existence of a positive return to the presence of disamenities on the jobs.
Misreport of quits The empirical strategy relies on the diﬀerentiation between quits
and layoﬀs as observationally diﬀerent concepts. We discuss below that self-reported quits
are less likely to stop working than self-reported layoﬀs, and also are more likely to report
higher satisfaction a year after the change. Yet, some of the quits we ￿nd may be ￿disguised
layoﬀs￿ Assuming that these workers draw on average worse matches from the distribution
of job values, one would expect that their wages fall relative to ￿true quits￿, and their
consumption of disamenities increases. That is, ￿false quits￿ are likely to bias our upward
b o u n do nc o m p e n s a t i n gw a g ed i ﬀerentials toward zero.
4 The measure of disamenities
This section explores what characteristics of jobs change when workers report a worse work
load, worse regulation of hours and job security following a change of positions. The GSOEP
contains two sources of information about job characteristics. In the 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995
and 2001 waves of the GSOEP respondents are asked to report detailed characteristics of
their jobs. Namely they are asked whether or not (1) they are exposed to bad environmental
conditions (2) shift work is required in their present position (3) the night turn is required in
their position (4) their job is physically strenuous, and (5) their work is mentally strenuous.
As explained in the previous subsection, the GSOEP also contains a yearly question for job
changers in which respondents are explicitly asked to compare characteristics of their jobs.
To understand what characteristics underlie the report of worse characteristics we built a
sample of workers who report at least a position change during the period 1986-2001. The
sample includes reported voluntary moves across ￿rms, changes in jobs across ￿rms when
the original position was terminated by the employer and position changes within the ￿rm.
Then we compare the workers￿ report of the change in ￿work load￿ and ￿hours regulations￿
to the report on the ￿ve characteristics in the 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995 and 2001 waves. That
sample size is much smaller than the main one used for the wage regression (3.1) because not
for all job changers we have the detailed characteristics in the origin and destination job.22
22For example, imagine that a worker quits a job in 1993. In principle, the detailed characteristics on
physical eﬀort or environmental conditions were not asked in 1992 nor in 1994. Hence, we cannot directly
impute the (detailed) characteristics of the position held in those two years.
15To maximize the sample size, we create a new variable called ￿position held by the
worker.￿ Using the information in the GSOEP, we determine whether or not a worker is
holding the same position as last year. Then, we extend the characteristics reported on each
of the 1985, 1987, 1989, 1995 and 2001 waves to all the waves in which the individual reports
to work in the same position. Finally, we selected all males who (a) report that their current
job is diﬀerent from the one they held the previous year and (b) report characteristics (1)
through (5) of both their new ￿position￿ and the last one. The sample used for the analysis
contains 360 observations on 339 individuals who report a change in the job they held, and
provide information on the characteristics of the positions they held.
In the ￿rst column of Table 3, we report the coeﬃc i e n t so fa nO L Sr e g r e s s i o ni nw h i c h
the dependent variable takes value 1 if the worker reports that the work load improved
and 0 otherwise on the following variables ￿reported change in mental stress￿, ￿reported
change in physical eﬀort,￿ ￿reported change in environmental conditions,￿ ￿reported change
in whether doing shift work.￿ Each of these variables takes value 1(-1) if the worker reports
that in the new position, the reported presence of the disamenity is less (more) frequent
than in the previous position, and 0 if the disamenity is equally present in the prior and
current position. We also control for demographic variables, like a second-order polynomial
in the age of the worker at the time of the job change, in deviations from 30, and a separate
intercept for non married individuals. Finally, we also include a separate intercept that takes
value 1 if the worker changes to a blue collar position.23
Workers who report that their new job is less physically strenuous than their last one are
9% more likely to report that the work load is better in their new job than in the previous
one. Similarly, workers who increase their number of actual hours of work in the destination
job relative to their former one by 10 hours are 2.3% more likely to report that the work load
decreased after the change. The latter estimate is not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the
10% con￿dence level, though.24 The estimates are robust to alternative speci￿cations, like
Probit (Column 2.) Column 3 shows the coeﬃcients of a regression of the event ￿the work
load in the new position is worse than in the previous one￿ on the same set of regressors.
Again, exerting less physical eﬀort in the new job decreases the probability of reporting that
23The omitted group is a 30 year-old worker, switching to a white collar position without any change in
the characteristics detailed in waves 85, 87, 89, 95 and 2001 of the GSOEP.
24This estimate is somewhat sensitive to functional form, introducing a dummy for the increase in the
number of hours yields that an increase in the number of hours makes it 9% more likely to report a better
work load, and the estimate is signi￿cant at the 5% con￿dence level.
16the new job has a worse work load by 9%. Finally, workers who increase their number of
actual hours of work in the new job by 10 hours are 4% more likely to report that the new
job has a worse work load than the previous.
The ￿rst column in Table 4 presents the results of an OLS regression in which the
dependent variable takes value 1 if the worker reports that the regulation of hours in the
present job is better than in the last one. The set of regressors is the same as in Table 3, but
we introduce a measure of the number of hours of work that correspond to overtime. The
rationale is that holding the total number of hours constant, working more hours overtime
may be an undesirable characteristic of a job to the extent that overtime may involve work
in non-central hours of the day - see Hamermesh, (1999b). The probability of reporting
￿better regulation of hours￿ decreases by 5% if the new job requires 10 hours of work more
than the previous one. In the Probit speci￿cation, holding total hours of work constant, an
increase of 10 hours of overtime diminishes the probability of reporting a better regulation
of hours by 12 per cent (the coeﬃcient is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10.3 per
cent con￿dence level).25 The regressions in which the dependent variable is ￿work regulation
worsens￿ con￿rm the previous results.
Other results worth noting are that the prob a b i l i t yo fr e p o r t i n gaw o r s e n i n go ft h ew o r k
load is hump-shaped over the life-cycle. It increases up to age 35 and declines afterwards. For
the regulation of work hours, the pattern is less clear. Second, workers who report working
as blue collars are less likely to report a worsening of working conditions when changing
positions, perhaps because their initial jobs are more likely to involve these disamenity.
Our summary of the ￿ndings in this section is that the variation in work load reported
by job changers is correlated with variation in physical eﬀort and actual hours of work.
These are disamenities extensively studied in the existing literature on compensating wage
diﬀerentials (see Daniel and Sofer, 1998 or Duncan and Holmlund, 1983). Also, workers are
more likely to report that the regulation of hours has improved if their new job involves less
amount of overtime than the previous one.
25We have also ran regressions of the other variables ￿change in advancement possibilities,￿ ￿change in job
security￿ and ￿change in fringe bene￿ts￿ on the same set of regressors. Variation in job security is unrelated
to these disamenities, and we interpret that it is most likely related to the probability of losing a job.
174.1 Do these characteristics aﬀect satisfaction with the job?
The results in Section 2 only hold to the extent that disamenities enter the utility of a
worker with an unambiguous negative sign. Given that it is diﬃcult to make an a priori
assessment of whether or not a given characteristic aﬀects the utility of a worker, in this
subsection we make a direct test using individual reports of job satisfaction. In particular,
if workers diminish their utility when consuming disamenities on the job, we should observe
that an improvement in the working conditions, holding earnings constant, is associated to
an increase in the reported satisfaction of that worker.
We study of the evolution of satisfaction with the job after a change in the amenities
consumed on the job. Changes in job characteristics are only reported around a change
in the position in the GSOEP, either voluntary across ￿rms, changes within the ￿rms or
contracts terminated by the employer. We use a sample in which every voluntary transition
between full time jobs contributes one observation. The sample contains 1,164 voluntary job
changes belonging to 964 individuals. The speci￿cation we run is the following
∆U
∗
it = γ0 + γ1∆EARNit + γ2∆WORK it + γ3∆HOURSit + γ4∆SECit +
γ5∆BENit + γ6∆SKILLit + γ7∆COMMUTEit +
θXit + vit (4.1)
i indexes individuals and t denotes the wave in which the job change is observed. ∆U∗
it
denotes a latent variable indicating the change in individual￿s utility between the period prior
to a job change and the following. ∆EARNit takes value 1(-1) if the earnings are higher
( l o w e r )i nt h en e wj o bt h a ni nt h ep r e v i o u so n e .I tt a k e sv a l u ez e r oi fe a r n i n g sa r ea b o u tt h e
same in the new job and in the last one. The variable ∆WORK it takes value 1(-1) if the
new job after a voluntary change has a better(worse) work load than the previous one, 0 if
the work load is the same in both workers. The coding for the rest of the variables is the
same. ∆HOURSit denotes the regulation of hours, ∆SECit denotes job security, ∆BENit
denote fringe bene￿ts. ∆SKILLit takes value 1(-1) if the individual can use his skills and
knowledge more than in his last job, and zero if about the same. Finally, ∆COMMUTEit
denotes length of trip from and to work. Xit includes the deviation of age from 30 and
calendar year dummies. (4.1) is estimated for the sample of individuals who report at least
having experienced a voluntary job change. We estimate this model using an ordered Logit
18model in which the utility of the individual is proxied by the reported level of satisfaction with
the job. γ1 can be interpreted as the increase in satisfaction associated to an improvement
in earnings following a voluntary job change. A positive sign indicates that the presence of a
non-monetary amenity on the job raises the utility of the worker, so that he can potentially
forego earnings to achieve such characteristic. Reported satisfaction in the GSOEP variable
takes 10 values (from 0, very unsatis￿ed to 10, very satis￿ed.) Consequently, the variable
￿change in satisfaction￿ takes at most 20 values.
The ￿rst column in Table 5 contains the coeﬃcients γ1,..,γ7 in regression (4.1). Given
that the magnitudes of these coeﬃcients do not have a clear interpretation, we focus on
their signs. Column 1 in Table 5 presents a speci￿cation without covariates. The coeﬃcients
of change in earnings, work load and change in job security are positive and signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from zero. That is, an improvement in any of these characteristics is associated with
an increased report of satisfaction with the job after a voluntary job change. Improvements
in the regulation of hours of work results in an increase of satisfaction on average. Once we
control for the change in earnings, changes in fringe bene￿ts and commuting time seem not
to aﬀect satisfaction.26
The coeﬃcient of ￿better use of skills,￿ is a strong predictor of the evolution of satisfaction
following a job change, the estimate being three times as large as the coeﬃcient on the change
in earnings. While this speci￿c characteristic of a job has not been traditionally considered
in the compensating wage diﬀerentials literature, it seems to be strongly correlated with
individual reported satisfaction, holding income constant.
Clark (2001) shows evidence from UK that the current level of satisfaction is a good
predictor of future quitting behavior. If workers who are more dissatis￿ed with their current
job are more likely to report both improvements in any given characteristic and in satisfaction
after a job change, our estimates would re￿ect heterogeneity in satisfaction reports, rather
than the causal eﬀect of characteristics on satisfaction. To mitigate such biases, in Table
5, Column 2 we introduce a control for the level of satisfaction with the job before the
change.27 The pattern of coeﬃcients are robust to the inclusion of indicators of the two-digit
26A possible reason of the fact that fringe bene￿ts like health bene￿ts do not aﬀect satisfaction is that,
in Germany and unlike the US, health bene￿ts are available through the public sector. Hence, workers may
not be as concerned about ￿rm-speci￿cp r o v i s i o n .
27Introducing the mean level of satisfaction over the waves in which the individual was in the previous job
does not change the results. In earlier versions of this paper, we used an event study analysis to analyze the
eﬀect of the characteristics on satisfaction, using OLS models with an individual ￿xed eﬀect. The results
basically the same.
19industry prior to the job change, and demographic and human capital variables. Hence, in
our analysis, we focus on the eﬀect of work load, regulation of hours, job security and match
between the skills of a worker and the requirements in the position.
5 Wage regressions
The coeﬃcients in Table 6 presents the main results of the paper, with the results of regression
(3.1) for workers who reported having changed jobs voluntarily. The dependent variable is
the change in the logarithm of hourly wages after the job change, computed as the ratio of
monthly income and ￿agreed￿ hours. All models include age of the worker at the time of
the job change in diﬀerences from 30, age minus 30 squared and wave speci￿c intercepts. In
speci￿cations II-IV, we also include three dummies with the educational attainment of the
worker at the time of the job change. The constant term in the regression is an estimate of
the increase in log hourly wage following a voluntary job change for a 30 year old person,
who has completed vocational training but not college education, and who changed jobs in
1990. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity in wage growth and arbitrary
correlation within changes of the same worker. We exclude (log) wage increases exceeding 1
and -1.to avoid the in￿uence of a small set of large wage changes on our estimates.28 Finally,
we do not use nonlinear speci￿cations. One reason is that the main eﬀects in (1) are all
binary. Second, sample size considerations prevent us from exploring interactions between
the main eﬀects.
The ￿rst column of Table 6, reports the signs predicted if markets place monetary premia
on the presence of disamenities on the job. The discussion in Section 2 suggested two main
results. If markets place premia on the consumption of disamenities on a job, then voluntary
changes to jobs involving a fall in the consumption of disamenities should be associated
to either constant wages or to relative wage decreases. Second, if a market return to the
presence of a disamenity exists, increased consumption of disamenities should be associated
to relatively high wage increases, and improvements in the consumption of disamenities
should be related to low wage falls.
The coeﬃcient of ￿better work load￿ in the second row of model I, is -0.044 (.020).
W er e j e c tt h a tt h en u m b e ri sp o s i t i v ea ta n yp o p u l a rc o n ￿dence level, consistent with a
28Trimming the sample results in a dramatic reduction of standard errors of the coeﬃcient of interest (by
more than 25%). The point estimates are not very sensitive to trimming.
20market that places a return on the ￿work load￿ of a job. The estimate implies that, relative
to quitters who do not change their work load, wages decrease by 4.4% for workers who
change to jobs with better work load. The coeﬃcient of ￿worse work load￿ in the ￿rst
row of model I, is .051 (.024). The wage increase for a worker who changes to a job with
a worse work strain is 5.1 percent higher than the wage increase of a similar worker who
did not experience a worsening of the work load after the change. Also, according to the
m o d e li nS e c t i o n2 ,t h e5 . 1 %w a g ei n c r e a s ef o l l o w i n gac h a n g et oaj o bw i t hw o r s ew o r kl o a d
provides an upper bound on the market return to the work load in a job. Finally, the key
prediction is that the magnitude of the (log) wage increase following a voluntary job change
that involves a worsening of the work load is bigger in absolute value than the magnitude of
the wage decrease following a voluntary job change involving an improvement in the work
load. For the case of the work load, the empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis:
the relative associated wage increase of 5% following an increase in work load exceeds the
relative associated wage decrease of 3% (although we cannot reject that both numbers are
statistically equal).29
As discussed in Section 2, a report of ￿worse hours regulation￿ is more likely if the worker
reports doing more often overtime work. In the ￿rst column of Table 6, the estimate of ￿worse
hours regulation￿ is .046 (.027), positive, and signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 per
cent con￿dence level. The point value varies across speci￿cations. Taken at face value, the
point estimate implies that the wage increase for a worker who changes to a job with ￿worse
hours regulation￿ is 4.6 percent higher than the wage increase of a similar worker who did
not experience a worsening of the regulation of hours after the job change. The coeﬃcient of
￿better regulation of hours￿ is .029 (.021). The coeﬃcient is large, although not signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 10 per cent con￿dence level. The hypothesis that there is a penalty
on jobs with bad regulation of hours is not clearly supported by this speci￿cation.
Given the strong impact of changes in job security on worker￿s satisfaction, we ￿nd it
surprising that the coeﬃcients of the variables related to ￿security on the job￿ in Table 6 do
not show that workers trade-oﬀ wages and security on the job. The coeﬃcient on improved
job security is .017 (.18), positive, but small and not signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. There
is some controversy about the existence of a trade-oﬀ between job security and wages in
29Note that downward wage rigidity is unlikely to generate the asymetry in the absolute value of wage
changes: adding up the constant (.056) and the coeﬃcient of ￿better work load￿ (-.04), there is a 2% average
wage increase for workers who decrease their consumption of disamenities
21European countries, after the introduction of ￿xed-term contracts in Germany, Italy, France
and Spain.30 Fixed-term contracts could only be renewed at the will of the ￿rm, and the
no-renewal did not entail severance costs, and a worker holding one of these contracts faced
higher risks of losing his or her job than a worker with a permanent contract. De la Rica
(2003) documents a negative relationship between holding one of these contracts and wage
levels in Spain. The pattern of voluntary job changes provides little evidence of market
segmentation in insecure low-paying jobs and secure high-paying jobs.
The coeﬃcient of ￿worse match between skills of the worker and skills required on the
job￿ in the ￿rst speci￿cation of Table 6 is .065 (.027). To be induced to work in jobs that
involve skills less akin to theirs, workers require a wage increase of 6.5%, relative to workers
who change to a job requiring similar skills than the current one. Conversely, workers who
change to jobs that involve a better matching of their skill to the requirements experience
wage increases of about 3.3%, signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent con￿dence
level. Teulings and Gautier (forthcoming) propose a model with search frictions that con-
tradicts this ￿nding. In their model, jobs vary over the skill requirements, and workers over
their human capital, where workers who have a higher level of human capital have higher
productivity. Teulings and Gautier show that search frictions make workers accept jobs that
are not perfect matches to their ability, creating a concave relationship between wages and
workers skills. A possible interpretation of the results in Table 6 is that there are jobs that
require skills that workers do not typically acquire in the formal educational system. The
labor market places a wage premia on those jobs, as workers ￿nd it costly to learn those new
skills (see Table 5).
The second column in Table 6 adds the number of years of education and three separate
intercepts for the educational level of the worker at the time of the job change (not shown).
We also include a separate intercept for workers whose education level is not known. The
b a s i cr e s u l t sa r en o ta ﬀected.
Model III adds indicators of the (two-digit) industry of destination after the job change.
The rationale is to examine whether or not our estimates are picking up the eﬀect of dif-
ferential union power across industries, given that the German wage setting system relies
30For the German case, see Winkelmann and Zimmerman (1998). They claim that job stability did not
decrease over the period. There is a further issue about ￿xed-term contracts. These contracts may be used
as cheap screening devices by ￿rms that cannot observe the productivity of workers (usual contracts have
￿ring costs that make such screening process expensive). The theory of compensating diﬀerentials assumes
that, once a match is made, characteristics are observed to both parties.
22on industry-wide agreements ( Hunt, 1999).31 The coeﬃcients are similar and we do not
comment them in detail. Model IV includes indicators of whether or not the ￿rm of origin
or destination had more than 2,000 employees, to capture permanent wage diﬀerences re-
lated to costs of monitoring, as stressed by eﬃciency wage theories. It also adds controls
for changes in other job characteristics, like commuting time, fringe bene￿ts and changes
in advancement possibilities. The rationale is that we have only identi￿ed a subset of the
amenities that change when individuals change jobs. If other unobserved amenities change
when individuals switch jobs, and these unobserved variables are correlated to the amenities
we consider, our estimates would be biased. Once we condition for other characteristics
of jobs and industry dummies, the coeﬃcient on ￿improved match of skills and knowledge
required￿ falls to .023 (.020). Possibly, the .033 coeﬃcient of the ￿better match of skills and
knowledge￿ in Model 1 is picking up industry eﬀects.
In our view, the results in Table 6 do not support the hypothesis of negative associations
of disamenities and wages (or ￿segmented labor markets￿). Those theories predict that
average wage changes from jobs with disamenities to jobs with them ought to be positive
and signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. Rather, our results support the hypothesis that the
labor market places a wage premia to jobs that require physical strain, jobs that involve
skills that workers do not typically have and, more tentatively, on jobs with bad regulation
of hours. Interestingly, the hedonic regression method applied to GSOEP yields estimates
that reverse the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials (see Lorenz, 1989).
5.1 Robustness checks.
Controlling for overtime The hourly wage measure used in Table 6 may be mismeasured
because of over- or undertime. Increases of overtime work may increase the hourly wage in a
job, and are possibly correlated with the regulation of hours and the work load in the job (see
Table 2). Unfortunately, the GSOEP does not contain enough information to recover the
exact hourly wage. This section introduces a correction to correct for biases due to overtime
work, following Hunt (1999). The GSOEP contains information on monthly earnings (wM).
It also contains a measure of monthly hours: ￿agreed-upon weekly hours￿ (hs) and ￿actual
31One could argue that diﬀerential bargaining union power among industries may change not only the
wage growth, but also the relationship between wage changes and changes in disamenities (see Daniel and
Sofer (1998) and Duncan and Staﬀord (1980) for diﬀerent theoretical results on the eﬀect of diﬀerential union
power on the link between wages and disamenities). Our view of these theories is that they do not account
the possibility of job changes between industries, that can potentially erode industry-speci￿cr e t u r n s .
23hours in a normal week.￿ To ￿x ideas, monthly wages can be written as follows
wM = w[4.33hs +( 1+p)OTM − UTM] (5.1)
w is the hourly wage, the variable of interest. p i st h eo v e r t i m ep r e m i u ma n dOTM (UTM)
is the amount of overtime (undertime) last month. The GSOEP reports wM and hs, but UT
and OTM are both unobserved. Let us rewrite (3.1) as follows
∆log(w)=α + βx (5.2)
Manipulating (5.1) as in Hunt (1999), one can obtain the following approximation to
(5.2)






Hunt approximates OTM by the measure of overtime work in the GSOEP, multiplied by
4.33 , and makes no correction for undertime UTM. We follow a similar strategy, but place
no restrictions on the coeﬃcients of ∆
OTM
4.33hs.32 In Column 1 of Table 7, the coeﬃcient of the
indicator variable ￿work load increased￿ is .044 (.024), slightly smaller than the .051 (.024)
estimate in Table 6. The coeﬃcient of the variable ￿work load decreased￿ it is -.046 (.020),
slightly larger in magnitude. Once we control for industry dummies and size ￿rm controls,
the lower bound goes to -.035 (.02). All these coeﬃcients are signi￿cant at the 10 percent
con￿dence level. Contrary to the theory of compensating wage diﬀerentials, the coeﬃcient
of the variable ￿the regulation of hours improved￿ is .035 (.020), positive and signi￿cantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent con￿dence level. Hence, once we condition on overtime
measures, the evidence for monetary returns to jobs with bad regulation of hours is mixed.33
32The measure of monthly overtime is not available for 1987. Given the small sample size, we replaced
overtime work in that year by the diﬀerence between actual hours of work and agreed-upon hours.
33The results in Section 2 to bound the wage penalty. It can be shown that |b dhours
2 | equals δ+E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε ≥
−Z − δ,Z),w h e r eδ is the absolute value of the wage penalty on jobs with bad regulation of hours, and
E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε ≥− Z − δ,Z) is a positive selection term. According to the result in Column 4 of Table 7,
b dhours
2 equals .035 in absolute value. That, is, .035 is an upper bound on the wage penalty δ.A l s o ,b dhours
1
is positive and larger in absolute value than b dhours
2 . Hence, these results are consistent with a zero market
return to the presence on bad regulation of hours.
24A r ew ec a p t u r i n gp r o m o t i o n s ? There is a literature relating job mobility to learning
processes in which ￿rms learn about the (unobserved) productivity of their workers. For ex-
ample, Malcomson and MacLeod (1988) derive a model of the relationship between workers
and ￿rms in which ￿rms incentive their workers by oﬀering position-related wages. Most
productive workers self-select into these positions because their cost of eﬀort is lower. These
models also predict that, early in their careers, more able workers self-select into higher
ranked jobs and increase their wages by exerting increasing eﬀort. Less able workers may be
demoted from their previous position, experiencing opposite changes. In such case, charac-
teristics on the jobs and wages change in ways that do not necessarily re￿ect trade-oﬀs. We
use these theories to falsify our empirical strategy. A possible interpretation of our results
is that the variation in work load across positions is related to increasing eﬀort. Were that
the case, the positive correlation between increases in work load and wage gains would be
caused by ￿rm learning devices, rather than by compensating wage diﬀerentials.
We test such hypothesis running regression (2) on a sample of workers who change jobs
and stay in the same ￿rm. Following the literature on wage growth within the ￿rm (McCue,
1996), we assume that position changes within the ￿rm are mainly related to promotions and
do not necessarily reveal worker￿s preferences for job amenities. Our test is the following: if
we ￿nd the same pattern of correlations between wages and our measure of disamenities in
speci￿cation (2) on a sample of voluntary changers (who we assume that reveal preferences
about attributes) and on a sample of within-￿rm changes (who we assume that basically
go through promotions and demotions,) we may worry that our empirical strategy is really
capturing promotions.34
Table 8 presents the results of regression (2) on a sample of 316 changes within the ￿rm,
and the summary statistics of the sample, in the ￿fth column. In Column I, the coeﬃcient
on ￿work load increased￿ is .007 (.02). Hence, a change in the position within the ￿rm
that involves increasing the work load does not involve a wage change. The coeﬃcient on
￿work load decreased￿ is negative -.025 (standard error: .024), smaller to the corresponding
coeﬃcient in Table 6, albeit less precise. The third hypothesis in Section 2 that, in absolute
v a l u e ,t h ew a g ec h a n g ef o l l o w i n gaw o r s e n i n go ft h el o a di sh i g h e rt h a nt h ew a g ec h a n g e
following an improvement in conditions is rejected by the data. The same hypothesis is
34Our maintained hypothesis is that job characteristics vary more between than within ￿rms. Hence,
workers who want to change the amount of disamenities present on their job are more likely to change ￿rms
than to change positions within the ￿rm.
25also rejected for the variable ￿regulation of hours￿, as the coeﬃcient on ￿worse regulation
of hours￿ is .005 (standard error: .022), and the coeﬃcient of ￿better regulation of hours￿ is
-.053 (standard error: .026). In the case of the variable ￿match of worker￿s knowledge and
skills required by the job￿, the signs are reversed with respect to Table 6. Summarizing, we
interpret from the results in Table 8 that the market returns to a heavy work load, mismatch
of worker￿s knowledge and job skills and regulation of hours is not likely to be generated by
promotions.
Are quitters observationally diﬀerent from displaced workers? Our identi￿cation
strategy depends crucially on the self-report of a ￿resigning￿ from a job indicating volun-
tary job change, as opposed to a lay-oﬀ, for example. We have compared the evolution of
employment status and satisfaction for workers who report having left their job voluntarily
and workers whose job was terminated by the employer. We ￿nd that: (a) Out of 2,188
workers in the waves considered who report that their last position was terminated by the
employer, 36% (785) went either to unemployment or non employment. The corresponding
results for workers who report having resigned their jobs is 7% out of 3305 cases (b) Using an
event-study analysis, we ￿nd that reported satisfaction of workers whose job was terminated
by the employer decreases after the job change, while the satisfaction of workers who say
they changed voluntarily increases after the change. Hence, we interpret that, while some
quits may be disguised lay-oﬀs, on average, both types of moves are observationally diﬀerent.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper tests for the presence of wage returns to the presence of disamenities in a job,
exploiting the idea that workers who change jobs voluntarily, express their relative preference
between packages of wages and nonmonetary characteristics in their origin and destination
jobs. Hence, if the market creates a monetary return to the presence of a disamenity (a
t e s t a b l ea s s u m p t i o n ) ,t h ea v e r a g ew a g ec h a n g eo fw o r k e r sw h oq u i tt h e i rj o b ,t ot a k ea n -
other with higher (lower) consumption of disamenities, provides an upper (lower) bound on
the market return to the disamenity. This method has the advantage of not relying on vari-
ables that account for selectivity of workers into jobs, and, at the same time, do not aﬀect
wages. In addition, the proposed estimation method is robust to the presence of unobserved
h e t e r o g e n e i t yi nw o r k e r ￿ sp r o d u c t i v i t y ,a sl o n ga si ti sc o n s t a n to v e rt i m e .
26We implement this strategy using a panel of German workers. We consider physical eﬀort
requirements, regulation of working time, matching of worker￿s knowledge and required skills,
and job insecurity as disamenities. Even in a labor market like the German, commonly viewed
as very rigid, we ￿nd evidence of compensating wage diﬀerentials. The estimated market
r e t u r nt ot h ep r e s e n c eo faw o r ks t r a i ni naj o b( av a r i a b l ec o r r e l a t e dw i t hr e q u i r e m e n t so f
physical eﬀort) is between 3.5 and 5%. The market return to bad regulation of hours ( a
variable correlated with requirements of overtime work) is between zero and 4%, although,
the estimate is not always signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. Jobs, requiring unusual skills,
pay a wage premium bounded between 0 and 6 %. Finally, we do not ￿nd any systematic
relationship between wages and job security.
Our approach yields estimates of market equilibrium relationships, which is the ￿rst step
in recovering deep structural parameters of the utility function of workers (their marginal
willingness-to-pay) and the cost function of ￿rms (their marginal costs of oﬀering disameni-
ties.) Ultimately, in order to conduct policy simulations, we would be interested in structural
parameters of the utility function of the worker and the cost function of ￿rms. That task is
left for future research.
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297 Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
This appendix proves that, when markets place premia on disamenities, δ > 0, (the absolute
value of) average wage changes from jobs without disamenities to jobs with disamenities
exceeds the (absolute value of) average wage changes from jobs with disamenities to jobs
without them.
Consider the following moment, de￿ned in the text.
E(∆w|Q =1 ,D 1,D 0)=d0 + d11(D1 >D 0)+d21(D1 <D 0)
Where d1 and d2 can be de￿ned as follows, using the market equilibrium relationship
between wages and amenities.
d1 = δ + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε >Z− δ)
d2 = −δ + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z + δ)
Straightforward computations imply that
|d2| = |E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z + δ) − δ| = |E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > δ − Z) − (δ − Z) − Z| =
|A − Z| ≤ | − Z| = Z
Where A = E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z+δ)−(δ−Z) The ￿rst equality derives from the de￿nition
of d2. The second equality just adds and substracts Z. The inequality follows from the fact
that E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z +δ) i sap o s i t i v en u m b e rt h a tc a n n o tb el o w e rt h a nδ−Z. Hence, A
must be positive. Finally, A − Z must be smaller in absolute value than Z,a sb o t hA and
Z are positive numbers. then Similar computations imply that
|d1| = |δ + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε >Z− δ)| = |δ + E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε >Z− δ)|
≥ |δ + Z − δ| = Z
Hence, if δ > 0 |d2| < |d1| and d1 > δ
(ii) If d2 ≤ 0, −δ+E∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z+δ) ≤ 0,a n d ,g i v e nt h a tE∆ε(∆ε|∆ε > −Z+δ) ≥ 0,
|d2| < δ
308 Data appendix: Sample of quitters
We ￿rst use the question ￿Has your job situation changed since the beginning of (last year)?
1.Changed position.
2.Job with new employer
3.Became self-employed
4.Gone back to work after a break
5.Took up a job for the ￿rst time in my life
The ￿rst selection method is to use only individuals who have a job with a new employer
(answer 2). We identify quits using the question.￿Why did you leave this job? Which one
of the following points applies to you?￿
1. Given notice
2. Job ended automatically/time limit agreed upon before
3. Training over
4. Resigned
5. Business relation ended
6. By my own request transferred within the ￿rm
7. Sent to another position by the ￿rm
8. Own business given up/family business dissolved
9. Other
We consider as a ￿quit￿ the answer ￿resigned.￿ 3,502 male individuals between 18 and
60 years of age responded that they ￿resigned￿ their job between 1984 and 2001. After
adjusting for the possible double-counting of quits induced by the wording of the ￿rst question
(Winkelmann and Zimmermann,(1998)), we have 3,305 observations of quits. 1,712 of these
quits involved a position in which the worker was not in a full-time job, and in 610 cases,
we had quits from positions with tenure less than one year. Hence, we are left with 1,423
quits. We could de￿ne hourly wages for 898 cases, either because of missing values of income
in the present or in the last year or because of no information on standard hours in the
present or in the last year. We drop quits to or from self-employed positions, and quits that
involve wage changes higher than 2.71 times the previous wage or smaller than .37 times
the previous wage, obtaining a sample of 856 cases. After removing workers whose origin or
destination jobs had hours agreements below 15 hours a week or above 60 hours, we obtain
a sample of 838 cases. Finally, we drop 95 quits that involve positions in East Germany.
31Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample of voluntary changers across firms
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Net Monthly Earnings in destination job 2,892.81 1,202.82 1,045.3 11,470.22
Agreed hours in destination job 39.22 3.02 20 60
Hourly wage in destination job 17.43 7.04 6.62 66.22
Log hourly wage increase .085 .237 -.9876 .9861
Age 32.53 7.43 20 58
Single .35 .48 0 1
Years of education 11.93 2.51 7 18
Vocational School .58 .49 0 1
No vocational School .12 .32 0 1
College degree .16 .36 0 1
Education missing .14 .35 0 1
Satisfaction with the job -previous job, from 0 to 10 6.32 2.45 0 10
Satisfaction with health -prior to change, from 0 to 11 7.49 1.91 0 10
Reported characteristics of new job, compared to previous one
New job has higher wage .66 .47 0 1
New job has lower wage .10 .30 0 1
New job has better work load .36 .48 0 1
New job has worse work load .21 .41 0 1
Hours regulation in the new job is better .44 .50 0 1
Hours regulation in the new job is worse .16 .37 0 1
New job is more secure .38 .49 0 1
New job is less secure .06 .24 0 1
New job involves more use of skills .41 .491 0 1
New job involves less use of skills .16 .364 0 1
New job has better fringe benefits .35 .47 0 1
New job has worse fringe benefits .10 .30 0 1
New job involves less time to commute .34 .47 0 1
New job involves more time to commute .33 .47 0 1
Wave 85 .024 .15 0 1
Wave 86 .042 .20 0 1
Wave 87 .05 .22 0 1
Wave 88 .06 .25 0 1
Wave 89 .06 .24 0 1
Wave 90 .08 .27 0 1
Wave 91 .08 .27 0 1
Wave 92 .11 .31 0 1
Wave 93  .04 .20 0 1
Wave 94 .02 .13 0 1
Wave 95 .04 .20 0 1
Wave 96 .05 .22 0 1
Wave 97 .04 .20 0 1
Wave 98 .036 .184 0 1
Wave 99 .077 .261 0 1
Wave 2000 .066 .246 0 1
Wave 2001 .10 .31 0 1
a. Sample size=743 observations on 653 individuals
b. Hourly wage is defined as net monthly income divided by weekly agreed hours times 4.33.
It does not account for overtime (see Section 3)
c. Changes to jobs with agreed monthly hours below 15 hours or above 50 are excluded. Job changes in
which the wage increases by more than 2.71 times, or less than 0.36 times the previous wage are excluded
d. Monetary magnitudes in 1995 DM Table 2: Average wage changes by change of disamenities
Number of observations Mean wage change
(standard deviation)
Work load worsened 158 .139
(.24)
Work load stayed the same 316 .079
(.22)
Work load improved 269 .056
(.241)
Hours regulation worsened 120  .126
(.25)
Hours regulation stayed the same 297 .061
(.22)
Hours regulation improved 326 .088
(.246)
Job security worsened 46 .13
(.245)
Job security stayed the same 417 .074
(.249)
Job security improved 280 .091
(.22)
Match of skills to knowledge worsened 117  .125
(.256)
Match of skills to knowledge stayed the same 325  .055
(.22)
Match of skills to knowledge improved 301 .099
(.245)
Sample size=743 observations on 653 individuals
a. Wage is defined as net monthly income divided by agreed hours, and are not corrected for overtime
b. Changes to jobs with agreed monthly hours below 15 hours or above 56 are excluded. Job changes in which the
wage increases by more than 2.71 times, or less than 0.36 times the previous wage are also excluded
c. Monetary magnitudes in 1995 DM Table 3: Determinants of the change in the reported "work load" between the old and new job 
Dependent variable equals 1 Dependent variable equals 1
if work load improves  if work load worsens
Estimation method OLS Probit OLS  Probit
Reported change in mental stress  -0.026 -0.031 -0.004 -0.004
(0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
Reported change in physical effort 0.089 0.086 -0.082 -0.099
(0.044)** (0.043)** (0.041)** (0.047)**
Reported change in environmental conditions -0.016 -0.019 -0.047 -0.065
(0.042) (0.041) (0.038) (0.045)
Reported change in chances of doing shift work  0.017 0.020 -0.007 -0.004
(0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.050)
Change in actual hours of work  -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)** (0.002)**
(Age - 30)/10 -0.08 -0.08 0.08 0.09
(0.05)* (0.05)* (0.04)* (0.05)*
(Age - 30)* (Age- 30)/100 0.000 0.000 -0.03 -0.06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.03)*
Blue collar worker 0.087 0.091 -0.226 -0.238
(0.051)* (0.051)* (0.053)*** (0.055)***
Changed position within the same firm -0.033 -0.040 0.051 0.041
(0.081) (0.086) (0.102) (0.104)
Position terminated by employer -0.077 -0.073 0.056 0.073
(0.068) (0.058) (0.063) (0.082)
Constant 0.274 0.392
(0.042)*** (0.045)***
Number of observations: 360 360 360 360
R-squared 0.06 0.17
a. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticityand arbitrary correlation between observations of the same individual
b. Change in mental stress takes value 1 if the new job requires less mental stress, 
0 if it requires the same mental stress and -1 if the new job requires less mental stress. 
c. Changes in physical effort takes value 1(-1) if the new job requires less (more) physical effort than the previous one , 0 if the same.
d. Changes in environmental conditions takes value 1(-1) if the new job has better (worse) conditions than the previous one, 0 if the same.
e. Changes in chances of doing shift work takes value 1(-1) if the new job has less (more) chances of requiring shift work than the 
previous one, 0 if the same.
f. Change in actual hours of work is the difference in actual hours of work in a regular week between new and old job
g. Estimates of the derivative of the probability of report with respect to characteristics using PROBIT modelsTable 4: Determinants of the change in the reported "hours regulation" between the old and new job -all separations
Dependent variable takes value 1 Dependent variable takes value 1
if hours regulation improves if hours regulation worsens
OLS PROBIT OLS PROBIT
Change in mental stress  -0.045 -0.047 -0.013 -0.013
(0.038) (0.040) (0.032) (0.032)
Change in physical effort 0.024 0.024 -0.048 -0.065
(0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.036)*
Change in environmental conditions 0.067 0.065 -0.044 -0.047
(0.043) (0.043) (0.032) (0.034)
Change in chances of working night shift -0.004 -0.003 -0.016 -0.020
(0.047) (0.049) (0.039) (0.041)
Changes in hours -0.005 -0.005 0.006 0.005
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Changes in overtime hours -0.009 -0.013 0.011 0.009
(0.006) (0.0077) (0.006)* (0.005)*
(Age - 30)/10 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.06
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
(Age - 30)* (Age- 30)/100 -0.000 0.000 -0.05 -0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.021)** (0.026)**
Blue collar 0.071 0.077 -0.153 -0.158
(0.052) (0.052) (0.045)*** (0.046)***
Job change within the firm -0.007 -0.032 -0.231 -0.183
(0.084) (0.096) (0.079)*** (0.051)***
Involuntary job change -0.071 -0.068 0.050 0.053
(0.073) (0.063) (0.056) (0.067)
Constant 0.358 0.299
(0.045)*** (0.039)***
Number of observations 359 359 359 359
R-squared 0.12 0.13
a. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. *,** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% confidence level.
 within observations from the same individual
b. Change in mental stress takes value 1 if the new job requires less mental stress, 
0 if it requires the same mental stress and -1 if the new job requires less mental stress. 
c. Changes in physical effort takes value 1(-1) if the new job requires less (more) physical effort than the previous one , 0 if the same.
d. Changes in environmental conditions takes value 1(-1) if the new job has better (worse) conditions than the previous one, 0 if the same.
e. Changes in chances of doing shift work takes value 1(-1) if the new job has less (more) chances of requiring shift work than the 
f. Change in actual hours of work takes value 1(-1) if the job requires less (more) hours than the previous, 0 otherwise
g. Changes in overtime is the difference between the number in overtime hours in the previous month in the current job 
and the previous one.
h. The estimates in the PROBIT column reflect the derivative of the probability with respect to the characteristic, 
evaluated at sample meansTable 5: The effect of changes in job characteristics on self-reported satisfaction -sample of quits
Dependent variable: change in reported satisfaction after a job change, scale from -10 to 10 
Estimation method: Ordered Logit
[Model I] [Model II] [Model III] [Model IV] [Model V]
Change in earnings 0.147 0.356 0.364 0.355 0.404
(1 if improved, zero if same, -1 if worse) (0.082)* (0.086)*** (0.090)*** (0.090)*** (0.070)***
Change in security on the job 0.230 0.378 0.437 0.446 0.488
(0.103)** (0.111)*** (0.114)*** (0.116)*** (0.095)***
Change in work load 0.239 0.383 0.404 0.432 0.424
(0.080)*** (0.085)*** (0.088)*** (0.090)*** (0.076)***
Change in hours regulation 0.140 0.157 0.180 0.168 0.172
(0.087) (0.090)* (0.093)* (0.095)* (0.080)**
Change in fringe benefits 0.044 0.019 0.031 0.026 0.073
(0.101) (0.102) (0.105) (0.106) (0.088)
Change in commuting -0.002 0.076 0.051 0.054 0.039
(0.070) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.063)
Change in use of skills 0.452 0.562 0.567 0.553 0.516
(0.085)*** (0.089)*** (0.091)*** (0.091)*** (0.080)***
Satisfaction before the change -0.948 -0.962 -0.963 -0.889
(from 0, very unsatisfied, to 10, very satisfied) (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.033)***
Age - 30 -0.009 -0.009
(0.014) (0.011)
Age - 30 squared -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)








Years of education -0.008 0.030
(0.046) (0.039)
Wave dummies Y Y Y Y Y
Industry dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,164 1,151
*,** and ***: the estimate is significantly different from zero at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, resp.
a. Coefficients are the ordered logit coefficients.
b. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and arbitrary autocorrelation within individuals.
c. Work load takes value 1(-1) if the new job has a better(worse) work load than the previous one, zero if similar.
d. Earnings takes value 1(-1) if earnings in  new job are higher than in the previous one, zero if similar
e. Fringe benefits takes value 1(-1) if the new job has better benefits than the previous one, zero if similar
f. Commuting takes value 1(-1) if the new job implies a shorter (longer) commute than the previous one, zero if similar
g. Use of skills takes value 1(-1) if new job the worker uses more(less) his skills in the present job than 
in the previous one, zero if the use is similar.Dependent variable: Change in the logarithm of the contracted hourly wage after a quit
Independent vars. Sign  Model I Model II Model III Model IV
consistent with CD
Work load worsened positive 0.051 0.046 0.048 0.052
(1 if worsened, 0 otherwise) (0.024)** (0.024)* (0.025)** (0.025)**
Work load improved zero/negative -0.044 -0.041 -0.034 -0.034
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)* (0.020)*
Hours regulation worsened positive 0.046 0.047 0.045 0.045
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.027)* (0.027)* (0.028) (0.028)
Hours regulation improved zero/negative 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.029
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Use less knowledge positive 0.065 0.067 0.076 0.074
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.027)** (0.027)** (0.027)*** (0.027)***
Use more knowledge zero/negative 0.033 0.030 0.024 0.023
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.019)* (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Job security worsened positive 0.014 0.013 0.046 0.044
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Job security improved zero/negative 0.017 0.018 -0.004 -0.007
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
(Age - 30)/10 -0.030 -0.043 -0.040 -0.034
(0.021) (0.022)* (0.023)* (0.023)
(Age - 30)* (Age - 30)/100 0.021 0.028 0.031 0.028
(0.012)* (0.013)** (0.013)** (0.013)**
Satisfaction with job prior to the change -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Satisfaction with health prior to change 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Not married 0.022 0.017 0.012 0.009
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Destination firm had more 2000 employees 0.000
(0.027)
Previous firm had more 2000 employees 0.004
(0.022)
Years of Education 0.011 0.012 0.012
(0.006)* (0.006)* (0.006)*
Constant 0.059 0.052 0.057 0.043
(0.038) (0.038) (0.066) (0.068)
Industry dummies N N Y Y
Wave dummies Y Y Y Y
Other job characteristics N N N Y
Number of observations 743 743 740 740
R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.16 0.17
a. The sample consists of 743 voluntary job changes, made by 651 individuals
b. Wages are defined as the ratio of income last month divided by the number of hours agreed. 
c. Standard errors are corrected for heterogeneity in rates of growth across individuals
d. The reference group consists of individuals who changed jobs in 1990, nonpecuniary characteristics
were reported to be the same in the new and in the previous job, and had completed vocational education.
Table 6: The effect of nonpecuniary characteristics on hourly wages.Dependent variable: Change in the logarithm of the contracted hourly wage after a quit
Independent vars. Sign  Model I Model II Model III Model V
consistent with CD
Work load worsened positive 0.044 0.040 0.042 0.045
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.024)* (0.025) (0.025)* (0.025)*
Work load improved zero/negative -0.046 -0.042 -0.035 -0.035
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.020)* (0.020)*
Hours regulation worsened positive 0.044 0.045 0.043 0.043
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.027) (0.027)* (0.027) (0.027)
Hours regulation improved zero/negative 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.035
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.020)* (0.020)* (0.020) (0.021)*
Use less knowledge positive 0.065 0.066 0.075 0.074
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.026)** (0.026)** (0.026)*** (0.027)***
Use more knowledge zero/negative 0.029 0.026 0.021 0.020
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Job security worsened positive 0.010 0.010 0.042 0.039
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Job security improved zero/negative 0.015 0.016 -0.006 -0.009
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Increase in overtime/agreed hours 0.217 0.206 0.223 0.226
(0.075)*** (0.075)*** (0.074)*** (0.074)***
Constant 0.069 0.062 0.067 0.053
(0.038)* (0.037)* (0.064) (0.067)
Industry dummies? NNYY
Wave Dummies? YYYY
Other characteristics of jobs N N N Y
Sample size 743 743 740 740
R squared 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.18
a. Wages are defined as the ratio of income last month divided by the number of hours agreed. 
b. All specifications contain the same regressors as the corresponding models in Table 6, omitted for brevity
c. Standard errors are corrected for heterogeneity in rates of growth across individuals
d. The reference group consists of individuals who changed jobs in 1990, nonpecuniary characteristics
were reported to be the same in the new and in the previous job, and had completed vocational education.
Table 7: The effect of nonpecuniary characteristics on hourly wagesTable 8: The effect of nonpecuniary characteristics on hourly wages, within-firm changers
Dependent variable: Change in logarithm of contracted hourly wage after a change within the firm
Variable Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Mean
(st. dev.)
Work load worsened 0.007 0.003 0.011 0.015 .397
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (.49)
Work load improved -0.025 -0.024 -0.021 -0.018 .19
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (.39)
Hours regulation worsened 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.006 .18
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (.38)
Hours regulation improved -0.053 -0.052 -0.042 -0.053 .16
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.028)* (0.029)* (0.031) (0.031)* (.37)
Use less knowledge -0.067 -0.064 -0.063 -0.038 .14
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.029)** (0.031)** (0.034)* (0.036) (.35)
Use more knowledge -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 .45
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (.36)
Job security worsened 0.051 0.058 0.048 0.070 .05
(1 if worsened, 0 ow.) (0.058) (0.058) (0.053) (0.050) (.22)
Job security improved 0.032 0.036 0.019 0.007 .21
(1 if improved, 0 ow.) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (.41)
(Age - 30)/10 -0.045 -0.053 -0.059 -0.063 .58
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)* (0.033)* (.862)
(Age - 30)* (Age - 30)/100 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Satisfaction with job prior to change -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -.10
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (1.48)
Education missing 0.027 0.032 0.031 .05
(0.065) (0.068) (0.069) (.22)
Years of Education 0.005 0.005 0.006 12.52
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (2.59)
Satisfaction with health prior to change 0.002 0.001 -0.001 7.31
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (2.00)
Not married -0.023 -0.027 -0.026 -0.032 .32
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (.47)
Constant 0.132 0.135 -0.200 -0.201
(0.040)*** (0.039)*** (0.057)*** (0.059)***
Industry dummies N N Y Y
Wave dummies Y Y Y Y
Other job characteristics N N N Y
Number of observations 316 316 316 315
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.22 0.25
a. The sample consists of 274 individuals, for whom we observe 316 changes whithin the firm 
b. Wages are defined as the ratio of income last month divided by agreed hours. 
c. Standard errors are corrected for heterogeneity in individual wage growth rates, and for correlation between observations
d. The reference group consists of individuals who changed jobs in 1990, nonpecuniary characteristics
were reported to be the same in the new and in the previous job, and had completed vocational education.Table A.1 Descriptive statistics of the sample used for the regressions in Tables 3 and 4
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Work load improved .28 .45 0 1
Work load worsened .319 .466 0 1
Hours regulation improved .306 .461 0 1
Hours regulation worsened .194 .396 0 1
Reported change in mental stress  .056 .67 -1 1
Reported change in physical effort .194 .588 -1 1
Reported change in environmental conditions .123 .607 -1 1
Reported change in chances of doing shift work  -.029 .526 -1 1
Change in actual hours of work  .171 .639 -1 1
Change in hours of (monthly hours of) overtime .33 .43 -12 16.8
Age 34.08 8.7 20 60
Blue collar worker .49 .5 0 1
Changed position within the same firm .27 .44 0 1
Position terminated by employer .17 .38 0 1
Sample size: 360
a. Change in mental stress takes value 1 if the new job requires less mental stress, 
0 if it requires the same mental stress and -1 if the new job requires less mental stress. 
b. Changes in physical effort takes value 1(-1) if the new job requires less (more) physical effort than the previous one , 0 if the same.
c. Changes in environmental conditions takes value 1(-1) if the new job has better (worse) conditions than the previous one, 0 if the same.
d. Changes in chances of doing shift work takes value 1(-1) if the new job has less (more) chances of requiring shift work than the 
previous one, 0 if the same.
e. Change in actual hours of work takes value 1(-1) if the job requires less (more) hours than the previous, 0 otherwise